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Providing Fair Conditions of Competition
Under the Free Tirade Agreements of
the European Economic Community
E-J. Mestmieker*
Professor Mestmacker analyzes the competition provisions of the Free
Trade Agreements that the Community has negotiated with many of its trad-
ingpartners. The direct applicability of these provisions by reference to the
standards of Community law is considered and rejected Professor
Mestmacker then develops the relevant standards for applying these provi-
sions to commerce between the Community and its trading partners.
INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community has concluded numerous
treaties and conventions with other countries and international organi-
zations.' These treaties and conventions, although important to attain
the Community's economic,.political, and social goals, constitute a con-
tinuing source of problems. Problems arise because implementing such
treaties and conventions involves more than simply integrating interna-
tional law into a well-settled national system. Instead, to effect imple-
mentation, the Community must harmonize and coordinate the law
and policy of the Member States, in order to conform it with a strong
* Director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, Hamburg,
Federal Republic of Germany. Chairman of the German Monopolies Commission, 1973-1978.
Special Advisor of the EEC Commission for Competition Policy, 1960-1970. This article is a
translation of the author's contribution to Festschrift fOr Konrad Zweigert, 1981, by Thomas Hill,
A.B., 1974, Dartmouth University; J.D., 1977, New York University; L.L.M., 1980, Columbia
University. This article has also been published by A.ssuntos Europeus, Lisbon, Portugal.
1 See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, VOL. B: EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY TREATIEs (K.R. Simmonds gen. ed. 1974).
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but still evolving regional order.2
The treaties concluded by the Community include a series of bilat-
eral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the countries of the European
Free Trade Association. These agreements raise serious and funda-
mental issues in connection with the FTAs' provisions on competition.
A preliminary issue is whether these provisions are directly applicable
to private persons and business undertakings in the Community. A
second and related issue is whether direct applicability should be deter-
mined by the criteria developed for other international Community
treaties, or by the criteria used for internal Community law.
Community rules on competition, contained in Articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty, have been rendered directly applicable through
Regulation 17, and are the subject of an extensive administrative prac-
tice by Community institutions. The FTAs' rules on competition
closely track the language of Articles 85 and 86, but also reflect signifi-
cant and deliberate differences. Those differences suggest that the
FTAs' rules should not be made directly applicable by analogy to the
EEC rules on competition.
The Community has taken the view that its powers and functions
under Articles 85 and 86 suffice to discharge its obligations under the
FTAs' rules on competition. Accordingly, the Commission has en-
forced the latter through the application of antitrust principles devel-
oped as a part of Community law. It is questionable, however, whether
those principles-and the powers granted to the Community under Ar-
ticles 85 and 86-will be ultimately adequate to cover anti-competitive
conduct that violates the FTAs. This raises the larger issue of whether
the Community's executive and decision-making powers are generally
sufficient to discharge its treaty obligations.
This article attempts to develop several approaches to the above-
mentioned problems. Part I offers a summary of the FTAs and the
historical context in which they were created. Part II first sets forth the
general criteria developed by the European Court of Justice for deter-
mining the direct applicability of the Community's international trea-
ties. Second, the possibility of deciding the direct applicability of the
FTAs by reference to the standards of Community law is considered
and rejected. Finally, Part III applies previously developed principles
to the FTAs' rules on competition.
Part IV considers the Community's fulfillment of its treaty obliga-
2 See generally F. ALTING VON GEUSAU, EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING (1964); J. RAUX, LES
RELATIONS EXTERIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE (1966).
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tions under the FTA rules on competition. Section 1 examines the
Community's view that the EEC rules on competition suffice to dis-
charge the analogous FTA requirements. Section 2 is concerned with
the Commission's practice regarding implementation of the FTA rules
on competition. Finally, Section 3 examines the thesis of one commen-
tator who seeks to render the FTA rules on competition coextensive
with EEC law by making the FTA rules directly applicable in a limited
core area and conforming other areas to existing antitrust law. Al-
though that thesis ultimately is not persuasive, its examination serves to
highlight some of the practical and policy problems that accompany




On July 22, 1972, the European Economic Community concluded
Free Trade Agreements with Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden and
Switzerland.3 These agreements regulate the trade relations between
the remaining European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states and the
recently expanded Community that now includes Denmark, Great
Britain and Ireland. The Community concluded a corresponding
agreement with Norway after its accession failed to materialize.4 Simi-
lar treaties exist with Finland5 and Israel,6 suggesting that the Free
Trade Agreements have become a model for the Community's trade
policy. The Council of the EEC "concluded, adopted and confirmed"
each of these agreements by issuing a regulation to that effect.7 Addi-
3 Austria: Reg. No. 2836/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31, 1972, No. L 300/1;
Sweden: Reg. No. 2838/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31, 1972, No. L 300/96;
Switzerland (and Liechtenstein): Reg. No. 2840/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31,
1972, No. L 300/188; Iceland: Reg. No. 2842/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31,
1972, No. L 301/1; Portugal: Reg. No. 2944/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31, 1972,
No. L 301/164. On the history and origin of the FTAs, see 5 Bull. EG 9/11 (1972).
The English edition of the Official Journal of the European Communities did not commence
publication until January 1, 1973. Therefore, the above references are to the German edition, the
Amtsblaat der Europaschen Gemein schaften. Likewise, publication in English of the Bulletin of
the European Communities only began in 1973. Therefore, the above reference is to the German
edition. For the English text of the FTA with Austria, for example, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EURO-
PEAN CoMMuNITY LAW, Vol. BIII: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES B12-197 (1980). See also
notes 2-4 infra, for the official English text of FTAs concluded after January 1, 1973.
4 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 171) 2 (1973).
5 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 328) 2 (1973).
6 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 3 (1975).
7 On the significance of these Regulations under Community law, see Ohlinger, Rechtrfragen
des Freihandelsabkommens zwischen i)sterreich und der EWG, 34 ZEITSCHRIFT F0R AUS-
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tionally, for each treaty, the Community issues an appropriate regula-
tion governing jurisdiction and procedure, needed to implement the
precautionary measures and safeguard clauses included in the Free
Trade Agreements.'
The purposes of the Free Trade Agreements, according to the Pre-
amble and Article 1, are to expand trade between the contracting par-
ties, to provide fair conditions of competition for such trade, and thus
to contribute, through the removal of barriers to trade, to the harmoni-
ous development and expansion of world trade. Towards the realiza-
tion of those purposes, Article 13 prohibits the issuance of new
quantitative import restrictions or measures having equivalent effect,
and abolishes existing measures falling into those categories. In order
to provide fair conditions of competition, each of the agreements con-
tains in Article 23 identical rules on competition:
1. The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of
the Agreement in so far as they may affect trade between the Community
and [partner state]:
(i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition as regards the production of or trade in goods;
(ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the
territories of the Contracting Parties as a whole or in substantial part,
thereof....
Since the end of World War II, the development of international eco-
nomic law among western industrialized nations has been characterized
by the integration of measures of competition policy into trade and cus-
toms policy. That linkage already had appeared in the unsuccessful Ha-
vana Charter for an International Trade Organization, which included a
chapter on restrictive business practices.9 The Havana Charter required
every Member State to take appropriate measures and cooperate with the
organization:
[T]o prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises,
business practices affecting international trade which restrain competi-
tion, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or
L NDISCHES (OFFENTLICHES RECHT IND V6LKERRECHT [ZAORV] 655, 659 et seq. (1974). See
generally IPsEN, EUROPXISCHES GEMEINSCHAFrSRECHT 176-77 (1972), speaking of a "confirming
regulation" (translation by this author). For an overview, see Schwarze, Die EWGin ihren vilker-
rechilichen Beziehungen, 32 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFT [NJW] 456, 461-62 (1979).
8 E.g., Reg. No. 2837/72 (Council), Dec. 19, 1972, ABI. EG Dec. 31, 1972, No. L 300/94, for
Austria and, in English, Reg. No. 1692/73 (Council), 16 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 171) 103 (1973).
9 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held at Havana, Cuba, from Nov.
21, 1947, to Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related Documents (1948).
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trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the other objectives set
forth in Article 1. (Article 46(1)).
The Havana Charter left intact the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mem-
ber States to take measuies designed to eliminate restrictive practices
violating the convention. Each state, by legislation or other measures
within its territory, was to discharge its duties under the Charter. The
members were also obligated to cooperate with an international organi-
zation in the context of grievance proceedings instituted to investigate
restrictive trade practices (Article 48). The Member States agreed to
"take full account of" the requests, decisions and recommendations of
the organization (Article 50).
Article 15 of the EFTA contains rules on competition that parallel
those of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty in the assessment of what
constitutes conduct infringing upon fair competition.10 The powers of
the organization, conferred in Article 31, are modeled on those con-
tained in the Havana Charter. On the basis of determinations made by
an examining committee, the Council may make recommendations to
the Member States. If the recommendations are not implemented,
other member states can be authorized to take countermeasures. This
solution in turn served as the model for the Free Trade Agreements of
the Community.
The efforts to develop an international competition policy are
based on the realization that the increase in commercial activity result-
ing from the opening of markets could be eliminated or impeded by
privately imposed restrictions of competition. Nevertheless attempts to
establish effective measures against restrictions of competition at the
international level have not succeeded until now, except within the Eu-
ropean Economic Community. For that reason, the FTAs are mile-
stones in the development of international economic law. In
concluding those agreements, the Community is following a path simi-
lar to that of the United States, which included guidelines for mutual
action against harmful restrictions of competition in virtually every one
of its bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation."
The Community, however, has integrated its internal competition pol-
icy into the FTAs to a greater extent than the United States has ac-
counted for its domestic antitrust policy in its various trade agreements.
Substantively, the FTA rules on competition are modeled on Articles
10 European Free Trade Association, Text of Convention, approved Stockholm, Nov. 20, 1959.
For a systematic comparison, see SZOKOL6CZY-SYLLABA, EFTA: RESTRICTIVE BusINESs PRAc-
TICES 85 et seq. (1973).
11 For a detailed treatment, see RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRusT.
OVERLAP AND CONFLICT 448 et seq. (1970).
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85 and 86 of the EEC convention, although they do not directly address
"undertakings."1 2 Rather, the FTA rules are directed only at the con-
tracting states (Article 27(2)). The nullity sanction contained in Article
85(2) is also lacking in the FTA provisions. Moreover, Article 23 of the
FTAs does not include any language corresponding to the exemption
provisions of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.
2. Procedures and Institutions
The agreements provide for a "Joint Committee" which "shall be
responsible for the administration of the Agreement and shall ensure
its proper implementation" (Article 29). The Committee is composed
of representatives of the Community and of the other contracting party.
It always proceeds by "mutual agreement" (Article 30). The Joint
Committee, acting by mutual agreement, can make recommendations
and take decisions. These decisions are to be put into effect by the
contracting parties "in accordance with their own rules" (Article 29).
If one of the contracting parties believes that certain practices are
incompatible with the provisions on competition, it can take "appropri-
ate measures." The right to take such measures, however, must be ex-
ercised subject to the conditions and in accordance with the procedures
laid down in Article 27 of the agreement. If a contracting party consid-
ers a given practice incompatible with the proper functioning of the
agreement, it refers the matter to the Joint Committee. The latter then
has the task of examining the allegedly objectionable practices. The
contracting parties-but not undertakings-are obligated to provide
the Joint Committee with all relevant information and to give the
assistance required for such examination (Article 27).
If the Committee determines that a violation has occurred, it may
require the responsible contracting party to terminate the practices ob-
jected to within a time period fixed by the Committee. If those prac-
tices are not terminated, the other contracting party may adopt
safeguard measures "to deal with the serious difficulties resulting from
the practices in question." A contracting party has the same right of
taking safeguard measures if the Joint Committee has not reached
agreement within three months of when the matter was referred to it.
Safeguard measures may include "in particular" the withdrawal of
tariff concessions (Article 27).
The regulatory scheme of the FTAs differs fundamentally from
12 The German "Untermehmen" might be most accurately translated into American English as
"business enterprise" or simply "enterprise." Nevertheless this paper for the most part uses "un-
dertaking," since that term is used in the official English texts of the EEC Treaty and the FTAs.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3:296(1981)
proposals made by the Community in the negotiations for the associa-
tion of neutral European states in the sixties. The differences evidence
a change in the Community's foreign policy goals. Awareness of that
change is essential to understanding the substantive content of the
FTAs. 13 In negotiating about the association of neutral European
states, the Community insisted that association should approach com-
plete membership as nearly as compatible with the status of neutrality.
That concept required the establishment of procedures and institutions
that would allow the continuous adaptation of the law of the associated
states to the evolving law of the Community. The associated states, of
course, could not accept a continuing obligation to adjust their law in
conformity to the development of Community law without having any
voice in that development. The Community, however, was not willing
to grant non-members any influence upon the formation of policy by its
institutions. These difficulties could not be overcome. They explain
why the FTAs do not provide for any common institutions other than
the Joint Committee.' 4
Mutual harmonization in the development of Community law and
partner state law remains an unresolved issue. That problem is evi-
denced by seemingly contradictory statements of the contracting par-
ties. Upon approving each FTA, the Community published a
statement in its Official Journal to the effect that it would assess prac-
tices contrary to Article 23 on the basis of criteria arising from the ap-
plication of Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty. The partner
states did not accept that declaration, stating that their rights as estab-
lished by the agreements would not be altered thereby. 5 That signifies
clearly that Community law should not prejudice the interpretation of
the FTAs, notwithstanding the largely identical language of certain
provisions. The interpretation of the FTAs, however, is an issue alto-
gether distinct from another question that preoccupies current scholarly
discussion on the subject. That question is which (if any) provisions of
the FTAs are directly applicable to undertakings, after the model of
Community law. A resolution of the latter question in favor of direct
applicability does not determine whether and to what extent the provi-
sions of the FTAs should be interpreted in conformity to the decisions
13 On the negotiations for association agreements with neutral states, see Ohlinger, supra note
7, at 678 et seq. See also Rollenweger, Institutionelle und vilkerrechtliche Asfpekle des Freihandel-
sabkommens Schweiz-EWG, 1973 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT,
ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 82.
14 See Wellenstein, The Free Trade Agreements Between the Enlarged European Communities
and the EFTA-Countries, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 137 (1973).
15 Regarding Austria, see Ohlinger, supra note 7, at 675.
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of the European Court of Justice.' * Since the FTAs do not establish
any common organ with adjudicatory competence for applying their
provisions, each contracting party can autonomously take the safe-
guard measures authorized by Article 23 in the cases in which the Joint
Committee does not reach agreement.
Against this background, it bears examination whether Articles 13
and 23 of the FTAs are directly applicable (self-executing) within the
Community. The subject of that inquiry is whether those provisions
can effect legally binding rights and obligations not only between the
contracting parties, but also among private persons or between private
persons and states. In a procedural context, the issue is whether courts
and administrative organs can issue legally binding decisions to private
persons on the basis of the FTAs. 17 Once it is clear that an interna-
tional treaty forms part of an internal legal order, the further question
of its direct applicability to private persons must be decided by the
courts of the particular subject of international law that is party to and
bound by the treaty. International conventions concluded by the Com-
munity within the realm of its competence form, from their effective
date, "an integral part of Community law." Within the framework of
that system of law, the Court of Justice "has jurisdiction to give prelim-
inary rulings concerning. . . the interpretation" of agreements, under
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 8 The European Economic Community
concluded the FTAs on the basis of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty.
Therefore the Court of Justice has jurisdiction regarding the interpreta-
tion of those agreements.
Two recent decisions of the highest courts of Austria and Switzer-
land demonstrate the far-reaching practical significance of direct appli-
cability of the FTA provisions. In both cases, the issue was whether the
exercise of industrial property rights or copyrights could be deemed
measures having equivalent effect as quantitative restrictions, in con-
formity with decisions of the Court of Justice on Article 30 of the EEC
Treaty. The Austrian Oberste Gerichtshof denied the applicability of
16 The same approach is developed regarding Article 13 in Schluep, Die markenrechtliche
Rechisprechung des EuGH aus schweizeriseher Sicht, in HEFERMEHL, IPsEN & SIEBEN, NATION-
ALER MARKENSCHUTZ UND FREiER WvARENVERKEHR IN DER EURoPAIscHEN GEMEINSCHAFT
232, 259 (1979).
17 For a complete treatment of these issues in international law, see BLECKCMANN, BEGRIFF
UND KRITERIEN DER INNERSTAATLICHEN ANWENDUNG VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRXGE
(1970).
18 Haegeman v. Belgian State, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449, 459, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 515, 530 (preliminary ruling) (regarding the so-called Treaty of Athens concerning the associ-
ation of Greece).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3:296(1981)
Article 13 of the FTAs to the exercise of copyrights. 9 The Swiss
Bundesgericht likewise denied such applicability to the exercise of
trademark rights.2° It is likely that those judgments will influence the
development of Community law because of the doctrine of the reci-
procity of treaty obligations.2 Substantively, the application of the
rule prohibiting measures of equivalent effect as quantitative restric-
tions to the exercise of industrial property rights and copyrights is
closely related to the rules on competition. 22 Nevertheless the mean-
ings of those respective provisions in the FTAs must always be consid-
ered independently of each other.
II. CRITERIA FOR THE DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES IN THE DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE
The question whether the FTA rules on competition are directly
applicable must be answered in light of previous decisions of the Court
of Justice regarding the application of international treaties as part of
Community law. The first relevant decision concerned the question
whether Article XI of the GATT, prohibiting the use of quantitative
restrictions among the contracting parties, is directly applicable within
19 Decision of July 10, 1979, Austro Mechana Gesellschaft zur Verwaltung und Auswertung
von mechanisch-musikalischen Urheberrechten v. Granola Winter & Co., Schalplatienspezi-
alhaus, 1980 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT/INT. [GRUR/Int.] 185, with
a comment by Eugen Ulmer. See also Dittrich, Die Vertrilge 6sterreichs mil den Europdtfschen
Gemeinschaften und das Osterreichische Urheberrecht, 1977 JUtISTISCHE Bt.TTER [JBI.] 81
(1977). The court followed the view expressed by Dittrich.
20 105 BGE 49, 59 (1979); 1979 GRUR/Int. 569, "Ono." See also Kucsko, Parallelimporle
von Konzernmarkenwaren und die Freihandelsabkommen Osterreichs und der Schweiz mit der
EWG, 1980 GRUR/Int. 138.
21 See generally ULLRICH, EEC COMMENTARY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE EEC annot.
18.
22 In a landmark decision of February 9, 1982, the Court of Justice held that Articles 14 and
23 of the FTA with Portugal do not prevent the enforcement of a copyright in Great Britain
against the importation and marketing of Grammophon Records lawfully manufactured and
placed on the market in the Portuguese Republic by licensees of the proprietor. Polydor Ltd. and
RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., Case 270/80 (unreported). The Court distin-
guished the interpretation of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty as applied to industrial and commercial
property rights from the parallel provisions in the FTA, because they do not have the same pur-
pose as the EEC Treaty, which seeks to create a single market reproducing as closely as possible
the conditions of a domestic market. The case supports the view taken in this article that there are
material differences between Community law and international law in general. The Court puts
particular emphasis on the unique instruments which the Community has at its disposal in order
to achieve the uniform application of Community law and the progressive abolition of legislative
disparities within the Common Market. This reasoning is applicable to the FTA rules of competi-
tion as well.
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the Community.2 3 The Court first stated that the Community was
bound by GATT to the extent that under the EEC Treaty it had as-
sumed the powers previously exercised by Member States in the area of
tariff and trade policy. It went on to deny the direct applicability of the
particular provisions at issue. The court reasoned that GATT is
marked by the great flexibility of its provisions, particularly those con-
cerning derogation, that is to say the measures to be taken when con-
fronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts
between the contracting parties.24
In interpreting Article 2(1) of the Yaound6 Convention, the Court
of Justice also reasoned that the determinative issue is whether "the
spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Convention" appear
to establish an individual right of citizens of Community members to
rely on the treaty provisions in court. The court affirmed that right
with respect to the prohibition, in Article 2(1) of that treaty, of customs
duties and charges having equivalent effect. 25 The treaties at issue were
association agreements which the Community concluded on the basis
of Article 131 of the EEC Treaty with certain African states and with
Madagascar. Prior to the effective date of the treaties, those nations
had special relations with members of the EEC. The treaties impose
different obligations upon the African states than upon the Commu-
nity. The Court of Justice inferred from that imbalance of obligations
a purpose to promote the development of those states. Thus the imbal-
ance between the obligations of the Community and those of the asso-
ciated states is inherent in the special nature of the treaty and does not
prevent the Community from recognizing the direct applicability of
some of its provisions that are not directly applicable in the other con-
tracting states. The court deduced therefrom:
23 International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1219, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (reference for a preliminary ruling).
24 The Court of Justice reached the same result for Article II of the GATT, in a later decision
concerning the incompatibility of a compensatory levy with the rules of the GATT. Schliiter v.
Hauptzollamt Lorrach, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1135, 1157, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 113.
Legal commentators have been critical of those decisions, but to date have not influenced the
thinking of the court. See Waelbroeck, The Effect of GA77" within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 614 (1974); Schermers, Community Law andInternational Law, 12 COMM. MKT.
L. REv. 77 (1975). Compare Capelli, R4glementation du Gat, 1977 REv. M.C. 27 (1977); Kapteyn,
The "Domestic" Law Effect of Rules of International Law within the European Community System
of Law and the Question of the Se-Executing Character of GA7T Rules, 8 INT'L LAW. 74 (1974).
25 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana dele Finanze, [1976] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 129, 141, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 62,78 (preliminary ruling). See also White, Effects
of International Treaties within the Community Order, 10 INT'L LAW. 402, 405 (1976). See gener-
ally Ullrich, Der StandderAssoziierung afrikanischer Staaten mit der EWG, 135 ZETSCHRlFT FOR
DAs GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 444 (1971).
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By expressly referring, in Article 2(1) of the Convention, to Article 13
of the [EEC] Treaty, the Community undertook precisely the same obli-
gation towards the Associated States to abolish charges having equivalent
effect as, in the [EEC] Treaty, the Member States assumed towards each
other. Since this obligation is specific and not subject to any implied or
express reservation on the part of the Community, it is capable of confer-
ring on those subject to Community law the right to rely on it before the
courts and to do so with effect from 1 January 1970.16
In this case, direct applicability followed not only from the language of
the treaty provisions, but also from the express reference to a rule of
Community law, which rule in turn is directly applicable. The court
denied direct applicability, however, for Article 62 of the Lom& Con-
vention, which obligated each of the contracting parties to treat nation-
als and firms or companies of the other contracting party on a non-
discriminatory basis as regards matters of freedom of establishment
and provision of services.27 Under the agreement, this obligation is
subject to the express reservation that a contracting party which is un-
able to provide such treatment for a particular activity will not be
bound to do so. The Court of Justice inferred from the purpose of the
treaty that Article 62 does not oblige either of the two contracting
groups to give the nationals of the other contracting group treatment
identical to that reserved to its own nationals. Article 62 requires only
that nationals of any state belonging to the other group be treated on a
non-discriminatory basis.
A recent decision of the European Court of Justice concerns the
direct applicability of Article 13 of the FTA with Switzerland.2" The
question referred by the French court was whether the threat of penal
sanctions in the French law of customs could be considered a "measure
having equivalent effect" upon trade between Switzerland and the
Community. The German and British governments and the Commis-
sion, appearing in the case, argued that Article 13 of the FTAs could
not be interpreted like Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. The Court of
Justice, however, decided that the question should be resolved in the
same manner for both the EEC Treaty and the FTAs. It concluded
that an importer who has met his obligations under applicable Com-
munity import regulations could invoke the provisions of the EEC
26 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1976] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 129, 141-42, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 62, 78-79 (preliminary ruling).
27 Jean Razanatsimba, [19771 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, 2238-40, [1977] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8447.
28 Procureur de la R6publique v. Chatain, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1345, [1981] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 418 (preliminary ruling). See Neue Ztrcher Zeitung, Apr. 29, 1980, at 7.
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Treaty as well as the FTAs in defending himself against criminal
charges based on a national customs law.
The case law to date of the Court of Justice-including the most
recent case described above-leaves open a fundamental question that
is the major source of current scholarly controversy about direct appli-
cability of the FTAs; namely whether the international treaties entered
into by the Community should be assessed by the same criteria that the
Court has used for adjudicating the direct applicability of Community
law and for determining the rank of Community law as compared to
the national law of the Member States. In arguing for the direct appli-
cabi ity of the FTA rules on competition or of Article 13 (measures
having equivalent effect), one can rely on the parallels of language in
certain important respects between the FTAs and the Treaty of Rome,
the equivalence of their bases in international law, and their common
purpose. Some scholars have gone so far as to claim that the common
history of the EEC members and the EFTA nations and their common
ancient Christian tradition support the basic equivalence in legal status
of the FTAs and the EEC treaty.29 The thesis, however, that the FTAs
and the Treaty of Rome conform to each other in spirit, structure and
language cannot be derived solely from their common basis in interna-
tional law. In the closing arguments to the Bresciani case,3° Advocate
General Trabucci pointed out their differences. The priority of rules of
Community law over national law and the direct effect of the former
are a function of the special features and practical requirements of the
Community system. The legal order of the Community must be
sharply distinguished from the general system of international law.
Nevertheless some scholars adhere to the thesis that the FTAs, subject
to consideration for their peculiarities, should be interpreted in the
same fashion as Community law.31
In interpreting the FTAs, however, it must be recalled that they
did not establish an autonomous legal order, the norms of which can be
uniformly interpreted and applied. Moreover, the legal system of the
Community is not adequately represented in a comparative analysis
that draws only on the body of directly applicable Community law.
29 See Hunnings, Enforceability of the EEC-EFrI, Free Trade Agreements, 2 EUR. L. REv.
163, 164 (1977).
30 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1976] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 129, 148, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 62, 70-71 (preliminary ruling).
31 Compare Hunnings, note 29 supra, with KOCHLER, LIZENZVERTRIGE IM EWG-REcHT
EINSCHLIESSLICH DER FREH-IANDELSABKOMMEN Mrr DEN EFTA-STAATEN 191 (rules on compe-
tition), 206 (Article 13 of the FTAs) (1976); Kilchler, Gewerbliche Schutzrechte undFreihandelsver-
trage Schweiz-EWG, 94/1 ZSR 177, 190 (1975).
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The analysis should also take into account complementary Community
institutions in the areas of legislation and harmonization of laws.
Those complementing functions form a basis for the systematic inter-
pretation of Community law and the cooperation of Community or-
gans and Member States in the development of Community law and in
the adaptation of national law to the requirements of the Community.
This becomes particularly apparent in considering the case law on Arti-
cle 30 of the EEC Treaty. The Court of Justice has ruled national price
or quality regulations to be "measures having equivalent effect," to the
extent that they work to the disadvantage of imports from Member
States.32 The court does not concern itself with whether the national
rules remain functional without the components deemed to violate
Community law. Purely as a legal matter, it is left to the Member
States to determine whether they want to conserve or alter such domes-
tic rules; in terms of economic policy, however, the tailoring of national
legal regulation to meet the norms of Community law leads to a perma-
nent narrowing of the range of policy choices remaining available to
Member States. Those consequences either must be accepted in view
of the universal nature of the Common Market and the obligations of
Member States to abstain from measures likely to jeopardize the Com-
munity (Article 5), or must be corrected by means of a coordination of
policies within the Community.
The history and origin of the FTAs suggest that their failure to
establish an institutional and a substantive legal framework for the de-
velopment of uniform law or a common commercial policy was delib-
erate. In its Omo decision, the Swiss Bundesgericht thus properly
emphasizes the lack of a common court and of an obligation of mutual
harmonization of law.
The meaning and structure of the FTAs are thus so different from
the legal order of the Community that they cannot be interpreted by
the same standards as Community law.33 Nevertheless, it cannot be
ruled out that certain FTA provisions are directly applicable within the
Community on the basis of the criteria developed by the Court of Jus-
tice in the general context of international treaties. The similar or iden-
tical language of particular provisions, however, is not sufficient reason
for drawing that conclusion. Moreover, the provisions of the FTAs by
their own terms may not be susceptible to direct application to the
32 For a more detailed treatment, see E.-J. MESTMACKER, VEREINBARKEIT VON PREiS-
REGELUNGEN AUF DEM ARZNEIMITrELMARKT MIT DEM RECHT DER EURPXISCHEN WIRT-
SCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 52 (1979).
33 In the Polydor case, the Court of Justice adopted this argument. See note 22 supra.
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same extent as corresponding rules of Community law. That possibil-
ity should be taken into account in assessing the impact of the Sandoz
decision of April 24, 1980, of the Court of Justice.34 There the Court
attributed to Article 13 of the FTAs the same meaning as previously
given to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty in the core area of restrictions of
trade, which the customs union and the FTAs seek to counteract in the
same fashion. The case left undecided whether Article 13 of the FTAs
also limits the exercise of industrial property rights and copyrights after
the model of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. Legal commentators have
already proposed varying solutions to that issue .3  The above-de-
scribed decisions of the highest courts of Switzerland and Austria natu-
rally dannot prejudice adjudication of that issue within the
Community; but at a minimum those cases require consideration of the
effects on economic relations between the Community and the EFTA
states resulting from an opposite decision by the European Court of
Justice. In effect, a contrary decision of the European court would
mean that a product protected by an industrial property right or a
copyright could, with the owner's consent, be brought onto the market
in an FTA state and from there be imported into the Common Market.
The same owner, however, could prevent export out of the Common
Market into an FTA state by invoking the national law of the latter.
It cannot be determined as a general matter whether the direct ap-
plicability of particular FTA provisions will better serve the interests of
the Community or of the partner states. In any event, it is hardly justi-
fiable to accuse the Community organs of imperialism, as Hunnings
does, solely because they differentiate between Community law and the
FTAs.36 On the contrary, it is the partner states which emphatically
resist any suggestion of equivalence between the FTA provisions and
Community law, since they cannot influence the development of the
latter.
III. THE TREATMENT OF THE FTA RULES ON COMPETITION IN THE
COMMUNITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Community has issued comments on the interpretation and
application of the FTAs. Although not part of the treaty documents
34 Procureur de la Rdpublique v. Chatain, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1345, [1981] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 418 (preliminary ruling). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
35 See, eg., Schluep, supra note 16, at 257- 262 (treatment of trademarks of common origin).
For an earlier similar view, see Tilmann, Das markenrechtliche Importverbot bei "ur-
sprungsgleichen" Warenzeichen, 1975 RIW/AWD 479, 484.
36 For a criticism of this thesis, see Hunnings, note 30 supra, and accompanying text. See also
Waelbroeck, Enforceability of the EEC-EFTA Agreements: 4 Rep&y, 3 EuR. L. REv. 27 (1978).
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proper, these comments were issued on the occasion of the agreements'
signing and the respective partner states took cognizance of them. The
comment on Article 23 reads:
Since the FTAs fail to establish a single organ with jurisdiction to apply
their provisions, the contracting parties must effect compliance autono-
mously. A violation of these rules-which by contrast to the provisions of
the EEC treaty are not directly applicable to undertakings and do not
entail the nullity of an objectionable measure-leads in appropriate cases
to the application of safeguard measures by the contracting party that
feels injured by such violation.37
The Commission adds that the FTAs were not intended to depart sig-
nificantly from rules of law operative at the national level or within the
framework of other agreements concluded by any of the parties (agree-
ments with the Mediterranean states in the case of the Community, the
Treaty of Stockholm in the case of the EFTA members). The Swiss
Bundesrat issued a declaration with substantially similar comments on
the occasion of ratifying the Swiss FTA.38 Legal commentators for the
most part also support that view, irrespective of whether the question of
direct applicability is examined in terms of general international law, in
terms of the criteria established by the European Court of Justice for
the direct applicability of international treaties in the context of Com-
munity law, or in terms of the standards applied to that question in the
law of the partner states.39
The opposing view, to the effect that the FTA rules on competition
are directly applicable, is based on a direct analogy to Community law:
37 5 Bull. EG 9/11, 19 (1972). The translation is by the author, since the Bulletin was not
published in English prior to January 1, 1973.
38 [19721 II Schweizerisches Bundesblatt 703. See also the Bundesrat's reply of Feb. 18, 1976,
to the question posed by representative Jauslin, Stenografisches Bulletin, 1976 STR 177-78.
39 Arioli, Das zwischenstaatliche Kartell - und Wettbewerbsrechl gem&iB Art. 23ff. des Frei-
handelsabkommens, in WETTBEWERB UND KARTELLRECHT IM FREIHANDELSABKOMMEN
SCHWEIz-EWG 35, 40 (Meyer-Masilius ed. 1974); Koppensteiner, Osterreichisches und eur-
opdisches Kartellrecht, 1973 JUR. BL. 82, 104; Homburger, Zur international-lartellrechtlichen Situ-
ation der Schweiz: Unter besonderer Ber1icksichtigung des Freihandelsvertrages mit der EWG, 1972
SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [SJZ] 337, 342; Koller, Zur Frage der unmittelbaren
Anwendbarkeit von Art. 23 des Freihandelsabkommens Schweiz-EWG, in FESTOABE FOR HENRI
DESCHENAUX 593, 605 (1977); Waelbroeck, note 36 supra; Waelbroeck, L'eft direct de iaccord
relatfaux echanges commerciaux du 22juillet 1972 entre la Communautb Economique Europeenne
et la Conjf'eration Suisse, 29 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES REcHT, AN-
NUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 113 (1973); Hirsch, L'accord entre la Suisse et la CEE
conftre-t-il des droits auxparticuliers, 1974 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 194; Ohlinger, supra
note 7, at 672 etseq.; Schluep, supra note 16, at 254 n.1. For a complete treatment, see Roth, Die
Wettbewerbsregeln in den Freihandelsabkommen der EWG, 1978 WErTBEWERB IN RECHT UND
PRAxis 409, 413 et seq. Roth, however, wants to distinguish application of the rules on competi-
tion as a matter of Community law from application of those rules as a matter of international
law. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text infra.
European Free Trade Agreements
3:296(1981)
since Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty are directly applicable, the
same must be true of the FTA rules on competition, notwithstanding
certain differences in language.40 The rules on competition contained
in Article 15 of the Treaty of Stockholm, by comparison, indisputably
obligate only states.41 In comparing Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and
Article 23 of the FTAs, the following differences become apparent:
-the FTAs lack a nullity sanction or any other sanction that would be
mutually effective as between the contracting parties;
-the FTAs lack an exemptive provision corresponding to Article 85(3) of
the EEC treaty;
-the FTAs fail to impose any direct substantive or procedural obligation
upqn the undertakings whose conduct is the object of regulation;
-when a violation of the agreement has been determined, the FTAs obli-
gate only the contracting parties, rather than the offending undertaking,
to effect a termination of the objectionable practices;
-if a violation is not terminated or if the Joint Committee does not reach
agreement, the sanction provided in Article 27 of the FTAs is safeguard
measures, including particularly the withdrawal of tariff concessions.
These differences concern legal issues that are at the core of any anti-
trust legislation and that, indeed, had to be addressed in the develop-
ment of competition policy within the Community.
The described differences are not merely semantic, instead the
FTAs left deliberate gaps in the regulation of competition. Neither
Community law nor the domestic law of the FTA states leave such
issues to resolution by the judiciary. In the Community, for example,
the circumstances in which restrictive agreements will be void was an
intensely debated issue when Regulation 17 was being drafted,
notwithstanding the clear language of Article 85(2). Thus Regulation
17 represents a compromise that modulated the nullity sanction in a
variety of forms with the aid of the notification system. In the Bosch
case, the Court of Justice decided that Article 85 was not directly appli-
cable so long as the legislative organs of the Community had not pro-
vided the means for applying Article 85(1) and (3).42 Even if one
assumes the existence of an unwritten exemption provision correspond-
ing to Article 85(3), the problem is not solved. That assumption would
charge the courts with resolving an issue which the Community,
through Article 9(3) of Regulation 17, placed within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Commission in its capacity as an administrative organ.
The issuance of block exemptions, on the other hand, falls within the
40 See Hunnings, note 29 supra; Ktkchler, note 31 supra. Lut see Arioli, note 39 supra.
41 SZOKOL6CZY-SYLLABA, supra note 10, at 199-200.
42 De Geus v. Bosch, [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (reference for
a preliminary ruling).
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competence of the Council as legislator of the Community. Of course,
the procedure provided in Article 27 of the FTAs for ascertaining vio-
lations at a political level does not in itself preclude direct applicability.
The sanctions provided there, however, are incompatible with the di-
rect applicability of the rules on competition.43 Moreover, in compar-
ing the authorization to take safeguard measures under Article 27 of
the FTAs with the EEC Treaty, one finds that as a general rule the
latter authorizes Member States to take protective measures only dur-
ing the time that its provisions are not fully applicable (compare, for
example, Article 37(3) of the EEC Treaty). In other areas, protective
measures are also typically structured so that within their operative
scope they may include derogation of the treaty provisions (compare,
for example, Article 226(3) of the EEC Treaty).
The history and origin of the FTAs, their relation to the EEC
Treaty and the Treaty of Stockholm, and their above-noted gaps in
antitrust regulation lead to the conclusion that the FTA rules on com-
petition should be enforced at the level of public international law
through sanctions against the contracting parties only. Article 23 of the
FTAs, for the reasons given above, is not justiciable. That conclusion,
however, leaves unanswered the question of how the contracting par-
ties can autonomously fulfill their treaty obligations as a matter of in-
ternational law. That question is examined below as regards the
Community.
IV. THE AUTONOMOUS APPLICATION OF THE FTA RULES ON
COMPETITION IN THE COMMUNITY
1. Questions ofAuthority
In connection with entering into the FTAs, the Community issued
a unilateral declaration published in its Official Journal. In view of the
contracting parties' autonomous obligation to implement Article 23(1),
the Community declared, it would assess practices contrary to that pro-
vision on the basis of criteria arising from the application of Articles
85, 86, 90 and 92 of the treaty establishing the EEC. Although that
unilateral declaration cannot prejudice the interpretation of the FTAs
in the Joint Committee, it is instructive as regards the problem of im-
plementation in the Community. The declaration assumes that the au-
thorized powers of the Community's organs under Articles 85 et seq.
basically suffice to meet its treaty obligations under Article 23. To the
extent that view is correct, the issue of direct applicability of the FTA
43 See Waelbroeck, supra note 24, at 634.
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rules on competition within the Community has no practical signifi-
cance because the EEC rules on competition are in any event directly
applicable under Regulation 17. The conception of the Council of the
Community-which must also be taken as the conception of its Mem-
ber States-that the FTAs are not to enlarge the powers of the Com-
mission granted under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, is tenable
only on the above-described premise that those powers suffice to fulfill
the FTA obligations. That thesis, however, leaves unresolved those
cases in which the FTA rules on competition, but not the correspond-
ing rules of the EEC Treaty, were violated. This situation might arise,
for instance, if the conduct at issue does not affect trade between Mem-
ber States.
The legal power which the Community claims as authorizing it to
conclude the FTAs is not a sufficient basis for determining whether the
possibility of applying the FTA rules on competition without simulta-
neous applicability of the EEC competition rules was taken into ac-
count. The Community invoked "in particular" its foreign commerce
powers under Article 113 of the EEC Treaty as authority for entering
into the FTAs. It is disputed, however, how far those powers extend in
practice and whether they cover the conclusion of agreements with in-
dependent rules on competition.44 On the assumption that Article 113
authorizes adoption of the FTA rules on competition, a discrepancy
between the latter and the EEC rules on competition must be consid-
ered possible. The contrary assumption is that in agreeing to the FTA
rules on competition the Community relied on an external competence
derived from the internal powers of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. Under the latter assumption, the Community could recognize a
violation of the FTA rules on competition only if the conduct at issue
also affected trade between Member States. In the AETR case, the
Court of Justice decided that authority for entering into an interna-
tional agreement could derive not only from an express grant of power
by the EEC Treaty, but may also flow from other provisions of that
treaty together with measures adopted by the Community institutions
within the framework of such provisions:
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down
common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no
longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to under-
take obligations with third countries which affect those rules.
As and when such common rules come into being, the Community
44 For a detailed treatment, see Roth, supra note 39, at 417 et seq.
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alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations to-
wards third countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the
Community legal system.45
These conditions are met in the context of the common competition
policy. If the FTAs, insofar as they concern antitrust law, were con-
cluded pursuant to internal powers, the requirement of an effect on
trade between Member States must be read into the FTAs as a matter
of Community law.4 6 That raises the issue whether the Community's
decision-making powers flowing from the legal sources described are
sufficiently extensive to enable it to discharge its obligations under trea-
ties with third states. That question, like the practical significance of
direct applicability of the FTA rules on competition within the Com-
munity, depends upon whether Articles 85 et seq. of the EEC Treaty
apply to all restrictions of competition that are incompatible with the
proper functioning of the FTAs.
2. The Practice of the Commission
The decisions of the Commission already afford insights about the
manner in which the EEC rules on competition can be applied to en-
force the FTA rules on competition. In economic terms, the conduct
usually at issue is either import restrictions agreed upon in the partner
states as regards the Common Market or export restrictions established
in the Common Market as regards the partner states.
a) Import Restrictions
In the case of import restrictions, it must be noted that the EEC
rules on competition may be applicable with respect to non-members
independently of the FTAs. Those rules apply to all restrictions of
competition that originate outside of the Common Market but have
effects therein. The extra-territorial applicability of Community law on
the basis of the effects doctrine (4uswirkungsprinzio or objektives Ter-
ritorialitatsrinzop) can be considered firmly established under the case
law of the Court of Justice.47 Moreover, the Commission has pro-
ceeded repeatedly against so-called self-limitation agreements that re-
45 Commission v. Council, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, 274, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
335, 355.
46 See Roth, supra note 39, at 417 et seq.
47 Beguelin v. S.A.G.L. Import-Export, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 949, 959-60, [19721
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81, 95-96 (reference for a preliminary ruling); ICI v. Commission, [1972] 2 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, 661-62, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557. In the ICI case, the Court of Justice
expressed no opinion on the limits of the effects doctrine because it attributed the conduct of the
foreign enterprises to their subsidiaries located within the Common Market. The Advocate Gen-
eral discussed those limits, see id. at 694-97.
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strict imports into the Common Market.4" Community law is
applicable if import restrictions agreed upon abroad have a noticeable
effect within the Common Market.
b) Export Restrictions
Community law also applies to restrictions of competition agreed
upon by undertakings in the Common Market to govern their conduct
outside of the Common Market, if they noticeably restrict competition
within the EEC and affect trade between Member States. The type of
conduct most prevalent in this context is restrictions on exports from
the Community to other countries. In these cases, however, the Com-
mission has generally not found an appreciable restriction of competi-
tion nor an effect on trade between Member States, accordingly issuing
negative clearances.4 9 Decisions of the Court of Justice have held that
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty applies if repercussions of export restric-
tions can be ascertained within the Common Market.5 0 In the Commer-
cial Solvents case, the Court of Justice made the following statement
regarding the effect on intra-Community trade resulting from the abuse
of a dominant position within the Common Market:
The Community authorities must therefore consider all the consequences
of the conduct complained of for the competitive structure in the Com-
mon Market without distinguishing between production intended for sale
within the market and that intended for export. When an undertaking in
a dominant position within the Common Market abuses its position in
such a way that a competitor in the Common Market is likely to be elimi-
nated, it does not matter whether the conduct relates to the latter's exports
or its trade within the Common Market, once it has been established that
this elimination will have repercussions on the competitive structure
within the Common Market. 5
More recent decisions of the Commission evidence its view that,
after the elimination of tariffs, restrictions on exports into FTA states
may constitute appreciable restrictions of competition within the Com-
mon Market. In granting exemptions or negative clearances for sole
distributorship systems, the Commission has not objected to prohibi-
tions of exports into third countries, but has demanded that enterprises
48 Commission Decision of Nov. 29, 1974, 17 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 343) 19 (1974) (Franco-
Japanese ballbearings agreement); Commission Decision of Jan. 8, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 29) 26 (1975) (preserved mushrooms).
49 E.-J. MESTMXCKER, EUROP.ISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT 159 et seq. (1974).
50 Suiker Unie v. Commission, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663, 2011-2020, [1976] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 295, 416-29.
51 Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223,252-53, [1974]
1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309, 342.
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forego such prohibitions, as regards FTA states, as soon as the contract
goods are no longer subject to customs duties in trade between the
Community and an EFTA country. That has been the case since July
1, 1972.52 These decisions correspond to an administrative practice
that generally requires enterprises to terminate prohibitions on exports
into EFTA countries as soon as the contract goods are no longer sub-
ject to customs duties. The Campari decision summarizes the criteria
which the Commission uses to assess the effects of export prohibitions
in the Common Market:
[Ilt is true that this obligation not only eliminates the freedom of the
licensees and their trade customers to do business in the relevant product
outside the EEC, but also prevents any distributor in a non-member
country from buying the product from the licensees or from a previous
purchaser for resale in the Common Market.
53
In the case of an export prohibition operative within the Community,
the Commission, with acquiescence of the Court of Justice, assumes
that "by its very nature" it constitutes a restriction of competition and
affects intra-Community trade.54 By contrast, export prohibitions re-
garding third countries, including the EFTA states, must be examined
as to their actual effects in light of other trade barriers. 5" A critical
evaluation of the above-described case practice leads to serious misgiv-
ings about the facile formulae used by the Commission to deny any
effect within the Community resulting from restrictions of exports into
third countries. Therefore the administrative and adjudicatory practice
regarding prohibitions of exports into EFTA states could lead to a de-
sirable improvement of the problem's treatment as regards third coun-
tries in general.
The above-sketched application of Community law to interna-
tional restrictions of competition does not suffice to capture restrictions
originating abroad against which the Commission has no practical
means of enforcement, notwithstanding the theoretical applicability of
Community law. Likewise, Community law may not reach cases in
52 Commission Decision of Dec. 15, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19, 22 (1976)
(SABA); Commission Decision of Dec. 21, 1976, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 10, 14, para. 24
(1977) (Junghans); Commission Decision of Dec. 23, 1977, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69
(1978) (Campari). In the Campari decision, the Commission reasoned that there was no apprecia-
ble restriction of competition resulting from the prohibition to export, in view of the still existing
customs barriers for alcoholic beverages. Id. at 74.
53 Id.
54 Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, [1978] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 334.
55 For a criticism of the adjudicatory practice of the Commission, see Bellis, International
Trade and the Competition Law ofthe European Economic Community, 16 COMM. MKT. L. REV.
647, 665 (1979).
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which the Community permits exports to EFTA countries, but the lat-
ter prevent those exports on the basis of internal national law. The
cited decisions of the highest courts of Austria and Switzerland bear
out that conflict in connection with industrial property rights.
3. Direct Applicability of the FTA Rules on Competition by Virtue of
Council Regulation
In his thorough treatment of the FTA rules on competition, Roth
recommended their direct applicability in a core area.56 He describes
that core area as consisting of those restrictions of competition that im-
pede the opening of markets sought by the FTAs. Those restrictions of
competition are to be prohibited directly and without any possibility of
exemption. Outside of that core area, the FTA rules on competition
are to be applied by way of narrow interpretation and only in conform-
ity to the antitrust law of the country affected by the restrictions at is-
sue. Thus Roth would meet the objection that the FTA rules on
competition may not be more exacting than Community law. Roth ar-
gues that his concept of limiting the direct applicability of Article 23 of
the FTAs in terms of the purpose underlying the FTAs follows within
the Common Market from the self-executing nature and direct applica-
bility of the Council regulation putting into force the FTAs. Of course,
Roth admits, the implementing regulation of the Community gives the
Commission jurisdiction to apply the FTAs. He further reasons, how-
ever, that the Commission has no adjudicatory authority over conduct
affecting third countries unless such conduct simultaneously constitutes
a violation of Articles 85 or 86 of the EEC Treaty. When conduct af-
fecting third countries does not violate Articles 85 or 86, jurisdiction
lies with national courts and antitrust authorities.
The critical issue is whether one can effectively identify restrictions
of competition that impede the opening of markets and therefore are to
be prohibited without exception. 7 Resolution of that issue will deter-
mine whether it is possible to reach the goal of interpreting Article 23
of the FTAs such that the antitrust law it embodies is no more stringent
than Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. If past experience in the Commu-
nity is any guide, that goal is unattainable. In the past, the grant of
56 See Roth, supra note 39, at 420 et seq.
57 Similar proposals were made regarding the interpretation of the EEC rules on competi-
tion prior to the effective date of Regulation 17 and regarding the interpretation of the intra-
Community trade clause. Compare, e.g., CoiN.,, KRONSTEIN & SCHLOcHAuER, FRANKFURTER
GuTACHTEN (1958); Steindorff, Das erbot von Weltbewerbsbeschriunkungen in derAnfangszeit der
EWG, 1958 DER BETRIEBSBERATER 89. See also Teichmann, Die Zwischenstaaichkeitsklauselin
4rt. 85 Abs. 1 EWHGV, 1969 WiRTscHAFr UND WETrBEwERB 675.
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block exemptions and the administrative practice concerning Article 85
have gone so far as to admit exceptions to the principles of free access
to markets, if they were justified as facilitating the entry of certain en-
terprises into a new market. One encounters further difficulties, also
familiar from the development of Community law, in separating those
parts of restrictive agreements that impede the opening of markets from
those parts with purely domestic effects. In addition, restrictions of
competition are not easily recognized as also intending or effecting a
restriction of access to markets. Express prohibitions of buying or sup-
plying goods are the exception rather than the rule and in any event
could be readily cast in the form of indirect restrictions of access, again
rendering recognition difficult. The resulting problems of interpreta-
tion would not only diminish the desired heightened effectiveness of
the rules on competition, but would also hinder the process of adapting
national antitrust law to the requirements of the FTAs.
To the extent that Community law does not capture import or ex-
port restrictions that violate the FTAs, Roth would deny the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission and instead accord jurisdiction to the antitrust
authorities and the courts of the Member States. That conclusion is
hardly persuasive, since the FTAs are based "in particular" on the for-
eign commerce powers of the Community under Article 113 of the
EEC Treaty, intended to enable the Community to develop a common
commercial policy in foreign trade that also meets the requirements of
intra-Community trade. The purposes underlying the foreign com-
merce powers are thus incompatible with granting adjudicatory power
to the Member States-in exclusion of the Commission-for the appli-
cation of the rules on competition contained in the FTAs. Even if it
turns out that the application of Articles 85 and 86 does not suffice to
discharge the Community's treaty obligations arising from Article 23 of
the FTAs, Roth's jurisdictional scheme is not compelling as a matter of
law. The interpretative declarations issued together with the imple-
menting regulations empower the Commission to interpret the EEC
rules on competition in accordance with the purposes of the FTAs. In
addition, Article 155 of the EEC Treaty enables the Council to confer
upon the Commission such powers as may be necessary to implement
the FTAs. The Council has that option under Article 155 because the
FTAs constitute rules laid down by the Council as to which it may
confer upon the Commission the requisite implementing powers. That
solution is preferable, in terms of competition policy as well as sound
law, to a division of jurisdiction between the Community and the
Member States.
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CONCLUSION
The view taken throughout this article is that the EEC Treaty es-
tablishes an autonomous legal order supported by a strong institutional
framework. The regional integration and the uniformity of norms
achieved by that legal order are much more advanced than within the
general system of international law. The structure and meaning of the
FTAs suggest that they form part of that general system and must be
interpreted in accordance with its standards rather than those of the
Community legal order.
That thesis provides an approach to a variety of problems arising
from the FTAs. First, the question of direct applicability should be
resolved by reference to standards developed for the Community's
other international treaties. By those standards, the FTA rules on com-
petition cannot be considered directly applicable. Second, the signifi-
cant differences between the FTA rules and the parallel EEC rules on
competition-which are directly applicable-negate the argument that
the FTA rules should be treated analogously.
Another area of concern is the Community's discharge of its obli-
gations under the FTA rules on competition. The Community's view is
that its powers and practice under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
suffice to discharge those obligations. That view is subject to question
in that the broad treaty-making powers of the Community may not be
covered entirely by its executive powers, with the result that the Com-
munity might lack power to discharge some of its treaty obligations
under international law. Nevertheless, the Commission's practice to
date is generally successful in applying the EEC rules on competition in
a manner that meets the FTA requirements on competition. If that
practice turns out to be inadequate in some future cases, the Commis-
sion may be able to assert or may be granted from the Council addi-
tional powers to implement the FTAs.
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